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than provided in Williams’s introductory
chapter is required for that undertaking.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Brasher, Bart. Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987–2015. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
257pp. $67

Bart Brasher begins his retrospective discussion of Implosion with a simple synopsis in chapter 1, “The Last 1,000 Days
of the Cold War.” Mentioned in this
chapter is a discussion of the period of
the Reagan administration when Defense
personnel numbers and budget authority
reached their peaks. He includes interesting USA Today statistics about defense
spending in the United States and in the
USSR, as well as a breakdown of how
many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines were serving. He also discusses
how each service recruits, tests, and promotes its enlisted and officer personnel.
Brasher then proceeds to the topic of the
security environment (primarily by describing where U.S. military forces are
deployed and in what numbers), the demise of the Soviet Union, and various
operations that the U.S. military was involved in through the end of the 1980s.
He closes this chapter with a discussion
of the base realignment process, military
readiness at the end of the Cold War, and
the size of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, reserve components, and
nuclear forces.
The book’s style is readable, and Brasher
takes time to explain acronyms, even to
describe how civilian control of the military is organized. His explanations about
the military and government processes
are clear even for the uninitiated.
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However, it is clear well before the end of
the first chapter that the author’s approach consists primarily of stringing together information gleaned from various
sources; the first thirty-four-page chapter
contains 151 endnotes. Also, the book is
replete with numbers and statistics; the
average paragraph contains at least two
or three. For example, the following is
the concluding paragraph of the discussion of Operation JUST CAUSE: “Casualty
figures for the invasion included 24
Americans dead, including two who were
killed accidentally by their own forces.
The number of U.S. wounded was 324,
while the PDF suffered 314 killed, 124
wounded, and 5,313 captured. Serious
estimates of Panamanian noncombatants
killed ran from 100 to 202. Within a few
years, Panama was a democracy and
Noriega was in a stateside prison, convicted of the narcotics charges brought
against him.”
The next several chapters fall into a pattern. For each year from 1990 through
1994, Brasher uses statistical tidbits to
discuss human resources, the security environment, the “Base Force” (and other
alternate force structures), military readiness, and downsizing. Each chapter sets
forth the “security environment,” a chronological account of defense and military
issues, primarily illuminated by forcedeployment statistics. Subchapters cover
in a clear and concise fashion such subjects
as contingency operations, the BottomUp Review, the base closure process,
modernization, and “topsizing.” Chapter
7 covers the downsizing of the military
from 1995 and 1996, and chapter 8 covers the “Quadrennial Defense Review and
the Out-Years, 1997 to 2015.” Brasher’s
conclusions, which occupy two pages, include: “Although many equate the initiation of personnel and force structure
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reductions with the end of the Cold War in
1989 or the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, DOD, as a whole, started downsizing in 1988. The Army and Air Force
started trimming forces in 1987 and the
Marine Corps followed suit the following
year. The Navy did not start reducing
numbers until 1990”; “For the most part,
it seems though DOD has managed to
keep the cream of the crop in a smaller
labor pool. . . . [T]he quality of the Army
officer contingent, already high, has been
improved by the SSB and VSI initiatives,
as most of the commissioned soldiers accepting the bonuses were from the bottom third of their year-groups”; “Some
were concerned that AfricanAmericans, as well as other minorities,
might bear a disproportionate share of
military personnel cuts, but that has not
transpired. Along the same line, opportunities for women in the armed forces
have not been put on hold because of the
downsizing. In fact, their representation
has reached record levels”; “Local communities have been hurt by the reduction
in the number of DOD installations that
started in 1988. However, in many cases,
that damages have been significantly less
than originally estimated. Thanks to a
higher percentage of personnel cuts than
base closures, the infrastructure of our
fighting establishment is now even more
out of sync with force structure than it
was in 1987.”
Other conclusions address the need for
increased modernization funding, force
hollowness (although not on the scale
seen in the 1970s), and reductions in personnel and funding (unaccompanied by
reductions in global security
commitments).
The author (a former Air Force officer of
thirteen years’ service) has consulted
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hundreds of sources for his book. The
bibliography is sixteen pages long. The
numbers and statistics are interesting individually, though their sheer volume is
overwhelming. The appendices are simple graphs showing a downward trend
from 1987 to 1998. What is missing are
conclusions and projections (beyond
those contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review) about the implications.
Implosion does a credible job of describing, with key statistics and simple explanations, the magnitude and process of
the downsizing of the military (the active
components were reduced 35.3 percent
between 1987 and 1998), but Brasher
seems too enamored of statistical pronouncements, leaving the reader waiting
for an answer to the question “What does
it all mean?” What will this massive force
and budgetary reduction mean for the
future of the United States military and
its role on the international stage?
If you are looking for a book full of quotable, surprising, and interesting statistics,
or for a concise, clearly explained, chronological timeline of how the military
was downsized since 1987, this book is
for you. However, you will not find pronouncements or predictions about how
the reduction in military forces and
funding, so carefully detailed and described, will affect the future. Nor does
this book pass judgment or offer praise
or criticism of how the downsizing occurred. Brasher discusses downsizing
much as a good reporter might (just the
facts), rather than as a commentator or
political analyst. Given the time frame
advertized in the title (1987–2015), the
author has done only half his job.
CARL CARLSON

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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